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MONTANA V. WYOMING AND NORTH DAKOTA; THE 
CONTOURS OF ADEQUATE NOTICE IN THE TONGUE RIVER 
BASIN 
 
E. Lars Phillips 
 
No. 137, Original 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Special Master Barton H. Thompson.  
 
Oral Argument: Thursday, May 1, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. in the Moot 
Courtroom, Room 80, at 559 Nathan Abbott Way, on the campus of 
Stanford University, Stanford, California  
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Did Wyoming violate the Yellowstone River Compact’s provisions 
governing the Tongue River in various years when senior, pre-1950 
water rights in Montana went unsatisfied while junior, post-1950 rights 
located upstream in Wyoming drew on the river? 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
The current iteration of Montana v. Wyoming addresses water usage 
on the Tongue River, which begins in Wyoming and travels through 
Montana on its way to the Yellowstone River. Eastern Montana is a 
notoriously dry environment; in basins like the Tongue River drainage, 
every drop of water matters. As the downstream neighbor, Montana 
depends on Wyoming to manage the uses on the Tongue that are located 
within its territory in accordance with the doctrine of prior 
appropriation.1 In 1950, in order to protect existing water rights and 
alleviate concerns over the impact of future development in the various 
watersheds (including the Tongue River drainage) that feed the 
Yellowstone River, Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota entered into 
the Yellowstone River Compact (Compact). The Compact recognized, 
and specifically protected, numerous pre-1950 water rights in Montana 
from being negatively impacted by post-Compact (post-1950) 
development on the Tongue River.2  
                                         
1
 The doctrine of prior appropriation holds that when a person takes an amount of water, usually 
from a stream or river, and puts that water to beneficial use, he has developed the right to continue 
such beneficial use with that amount of water. The next person to take an amount of water from that 
same source may also take as much as he can beneficially use. However, this person has a ‘junior’ 
right to the original, or senior, user, and the senior may request that the junior release water if the 
senior is not receiving the full amount that is due under his right. (First Interim Report of the Special 
Master 4-6 (Feb. 10, 2010)). 
2
 Montana’s Post Trial Br. 3 (March 31, 2014). 
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Since the Compact was signed, the dispute over water rights on the 
Tongue River has simmered for almost half a century. Montana contends 
that, since the signing, it has endeavored to work with Wyoming to find 
extralegal solutions to water usage issues in the drainage; the evidence 
supporting this claim highlights the futility of the efforts.3 Inevitably, the 
interstate issues surrounding senior and junior water rights in the basin 
boiled over into litigation.  
In February of 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Montana leave 
to file a bill of complaint against Wyoming.4 Montana claimed that by 
refusing to “curtail the consumption” by post-1950 water uses on the 
Tongue River, when pre-1950 water uses in Montana were unsatisfied, 
Wyoming had violated Article V of the Compact.5 The U.S. Supreme 
Court appointed a Special Master, the Honorable Barton H. Thompson, 
Jr., to oversee the proceedings.6 The most recent proceeding has focused 
on one question: whether or not the actions of Wyoming violated the 
Compact. Over the course of the trial, it became clear an affirmative 
finding of a violation would likely hinge on whether or not Montana 
provided Wyoming with adequate notice that pre-1950 appropriative  
rights on the Tongue River were not being satisfied in the years at issue. 
While the ultimate decision by the U.S. Supreme Court will determine 
whether Wyoming has violated the Compact in light of the evidence 
presented, this case will likely define what constitutes an adequate call 
on the Tongue River for years to come.  
 
III. SUMMARY OF CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
 
In May, 2014, advocates for Montana and Wyoming presented 
closing arguments to Special Master Thompson in an event spanning an 
entire day on the campus of Stanford University in San Francisco, 
California. Montana’s Attorney General, Tim Fox, began the day with a 
brief overview of the dispute as a whole. Fox painted a picture of the 
ongoing hardships faced by individual farmers, including those with pre-
1950 water rights, on the Tongue River. These hardships, Fox argued, 
were exacerbated by the fact that the State of Wyoming had “never taken 
a single action to provide any water to Montana under the Compact.”7 In 
presenting the argument this way, Fox illustrated the fundamental 
premise behind Montana’s position: the Compact obligated Wyoming to 
protect pre-1950 water rights from post-1950 uses and the unsatisfied 
                                         
3
 Id. at 12–19. 
4
 Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2008).  
5
 Bill of Complaint ¶ 8 (Jan. 2007).  
6
 A timeline of the case, including PDF versions of the documents, can be found at 
http://web.stanford.edu/dept/law/mvn.  
7
 Transcr. Post-Trial Hrg. Proc. 14:4–5 (May 1, 2014). 
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pre-1950 uses in Montana were prima facie proof of a violation of the 
Compact.  
James Kaste, Wyoming’s Senior Assistant Attorney General, 
countered by describing the dispute as revolving around “a simple breach 
of contract.” Therefore, Kaste argued, Montana must meet three criteria. 
First, Montana must prove that pre-1950 water rights were unsatisfied “at 
a specific place on the river at a specific time.”8 Second, Montana must 
prove “a specific shortage,” after the “appropriate intrastate 
mechanisms” had been implemented to ensure that post-1950 uses within 
Montana had already been curtailed.9 And third, Montana must provide 
Wyoming with adequate notice which, in light of the nature of the 
dispute, would be in the form of a call.10 While arguments explaining 
these three issues would guide the remainder of the closing arguments, 
the third issue, adequate notice, was particularly contested.  
 
A. Notice 
 
Montana and Wyoming advocated incredibly different views of what 
adequate notice in a call on the Tongue River would look like. The 
essential question, developed during the course of the arguments, was 
whether or not a call for water must not only inform the junior user that 
the senior was low on water but also include a demand that the junior 
user release the water. Arguing for Montana, Mr. Swanson, Deputy 
Attorney General for the State of Montana, suggested that, even though 
Montana felt it had provided adequate notice, Montana could avail itself 
of any of the three exceptions to the notice requirement previously 
recognized in the course of the proceedings.11 Specifically, Swanson 
emphasized the futility exception and highlighted the frustration of trying 
to reach an agreement with such a historically “unyielding” contractual 
partner like Wyoming.12 
For Wyoming, Kaste argued it was not sufficient for Montana to 
simply inform Wyoming of a shortage. He proposed that Montana must 
take the second step of making “a demand for water.” 13 The Special 
Master seemed to side with Wyoming and cited a U.S. Supreme Court 
                                         
8
 Id. at 21:22. 
9
 Id. at 22:3–8. 
10
 Id. at 23:15–23. 
11
 Three exceptions to the notice requirement were recognized by the Special Master. First, the 
futility exception, where it would be futile for Montana to issue further notice to Wyoming that it 
was short of water because Wyoming had made it clear it simply wasn’t going to remedy the 
situation. Second, the prior knowledge exception, where Montana could show that Wyoming already 
knew Montana’s pre-1950 senior appropriators were not receiving the water guaranteed to them 
under their rights. And third, the Compact administration exception, which would exist where 
Montana would try to “set up a process for meeting its rights under the Compact,” and the actions of 
Wyoming would evade those processes to such an extent that it would alleviate the need for notice. 
(Transcr. Post-Trial Hrg. Proc. 69:5–6). 
12
 Transcr. Post-Trial Hrg. Proc. at 61:8–18.  
13
 Id. at 58:5–6. 
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case for the premise that the senior user must inform the junior of his 
water shortage and then demand the junior release water to satisfy the 
senior right.14  
Kaste, however, went further and argued that not only was a demand 
required but the interstate relationship required increased specificity in 
the call itself. Kaste insisted Montana must be able to prove pre-1950 
water rights were unsatisfied “at a specific place on the river at a specific 
time.”15 In theory, such specifics would allow Wyoming to ensure that 
Montana was not issuing a call on the river without taking appropriate 
intrastate measures. In response, Montana maintained that, since 1952, 
interactions between the two sovereigns illustrated Wyoming’s penchant 
for using increased specificity was a smokescreen to further delay the 
delivery of water in a given year. 
 
B. Pre-1950 Uses in Montana 
 
Wyoming’s focus on specificity allowed a natural progression into 
the next topic for argument: the substantive nature of pre-1950 uses in 
Montana. This discussion was divided primarily into two issues: the 
storage rights and the direct flow rights in existence at the time of the 
Compact in 1950. Mr. Wechsler, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
provided the argument for Montana regarding storage rights on the 
Tongue and focused, specifically, on the Tongue River Reservoir 
(Reservoir). He presented the historical argument explaining how the 
storage capacity protected under the Compact was much greater than the 
amount recognized by Wyoming.  
Wyoming’s counter argument as to why the storage capacity of the 
Reservoir was less than the amount argued for by Montana was 
extensive. Mr. Kaste covered issues such as whether the one-fill rule 
applied in Montana and whether or not voluntary bypasses of water by 
the Reservoir should be counted against the Reservoir.16 The underlying 
current of the argument revolved around whether or not Montana was 
putting the full amount of water in the Tongue River Reservoir to 
beneficial use. Under the doctrine of appropriation, Kaste argued that, if 
Montana was being wasteful in its management of the Reservoir, it 
should not be able to force Wyoming to bail it out.17 When given the 
opportunity to rebut, Wechsler insisted Montana had continued to 
operate its reservoirs in a way that was reasonable, prudent, and 
“consistent with the doctrine of appropriation.”18  
                                         
14
 Id. at 65:18–23.  
15
 Id. at 21:22. 
16
 The one-fill rule refers to the premise that a reservoir’s storage right only guarantees the reservoir 
enough water to fill the reservoir once.  
17
 Transcr. Post-Trial Hrg. Proc. at 174: 6–18. 
18
 Id. at 189:13–16. 
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The discussion surrounding pre-1950 direct flow rights proved to be 
much simpler. Wechsler argued that the doctrine of appropriation 
governed the rights and therefore, once a right had been adjudicated, the 
user was “entitled to the amount of water to satisfy your water right.”19  
 
C. Post-1950 Uses in Wyoming 
 
The third, and final topic of the hearing revolved around post-1950 
uses in Wyoming. The arguments from both sides focused on the merits, 
or flaws, of various experts and models used by Montana to determine 
the amount of water Wyoming was liable for withholding from pre-1950 
users if found in violation of the Compact. The Special Master 
recognized this particular section as fact intensive and allowed only an 
hour for both sides to present their arguments. With Wyoming 
potentially on the hook for the numbers shown by Montana’s expert 
testimony, Mr. Kaste issued an impassioned argument against the 
validity of the expert and the model used in the expert’s analysis. His 
argument boiled down to the concept he had advocated for when 
discussing adequate notice earlier in the day: there must be some 
specific, particular proof before the Court can find the evidence of 
violation credible.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS  
 
By the conclusion of the proceedings, the underlying question of 
whether or not Wyoming had violated the Compact appeared at least 
partially resolved. It seemed likely that the Special Master would find for 
Montana on two of the years at issue, 2004 and 2006, solely because 
Wyoming admitted to having received adequate notice of a call on the 
river in those years. This suggests that adequate notice will prove to be 
the determinative factor for whether or not a violation of the Compact 
had occurred. Therefore, unfortunately for Montana, it is unlikely that 
the Special Master will agree that the evidence presented supports the 
premise that Montana issued calls on the Tongue River prior to 2004 and 
2006.  
This reliance on notice suggests that, while the Special Master’s 
recommendations to the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether 
Wyoming previously violated the Compact, the real impact of this case 
will be its future application. To illustrate, the Special Master will likely 
find that there are two distinct components to an interstate call on a river: 
(1) a statement informing the junior right that the senior right is 
unsatisfied and (2) a demand that the junior right release the water for the 
benefit of the senior. Furthermore, due to the importance placed on 
                                         
19
 Id. at 142:8–9. 
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adequate notice in the proceedings, it is likely that the first component, 
the statement informing the junior of the shortage, will require some 
level of detail. The rationale for this heightened specificity will likely lie 
in the importance of providing the junior use with the ability to prove the 
senior use was not able to issue a valid call on the river. The Special 
Master’s recommendation as to the necessary level of detail will likely 
fall closer to  Wyoming’s position that there must be an exact moment at 
an exact place on the river where the shortage can be proven than to 
Montana’s position that the simple fact of a shortage at a senior right is 
enough.  
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